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Abstract—Existing  research  treats  the  cooperative 
structure  as  relatively  homogeneous.  The  proposed 
paper argues that all cooperatives are not created equal 
–  and  consideration  of  organizational  structure  is 
critical  when  analyzing  the  economic  impact  of 
cooperation.  In  recent  empirical  work,  we  observe 
cooperatives  forming  as  single-  or  multi-purpose; 
generating  equity  capital  passively,  quasi-passively,  or 
proactively;  vertically  integrating  in  a  centralized, 
federated, or a hybrid fashion; governing through fixed 
or  proportional  control  rights;  and  instituting  open, 
closed  or  class-varying  membership  criteria.  The 
emergence  of  multiple-level  rent-seeking  cooperatives 
challenges  our  traditional  rent  dispersion  models  of 
collective action. We call these multi-level, patron, rent-
seeking  entities  a  form  of  collective  entrepreneurship.  
This  paper  develops  a  set  of  criteria  enabling  us  to 
distinguish  between  traditional  forms  of  cooperation 
and  collective  entrepreneurship.    We  employ  these 
characteristics  to  analyze  and  contrast  these  two 
extreme  forms  of  collective  action.    We  propose  a 
continuum  from  single-level  rent  seeking,  traditional, 
patron, user-driven cooperative forms; through forms of 
hybrids  and  macrohierarchies;  to  multiple-level  rent 
seeking,  patron,  user-investor-driven  collective 
entrepreneurship. 
Keywords—  Collective  entrepreneurship, 
Agribusiness, Property Rights  
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  advance  the 
discussion  of  an  emerging  concept  identified  as 
―collective  entrepreneurship‖.    Our  approach  is  to 
proffer  a  definition,  then  attempt  to  defend  the 
definition by suggesting criteria that might inform the 
development  of  an  organizational  design  that  is 
encountered  in  an  increasing  number  of  countries 
where producers are seeking to extract rents in a joint 
vertical coordination set of activities.  
 While  this  article  seeks  to  compare  and  contrast 
two extremes in organizational design, it is important 
to  note  that  a  large  variety  of  cooperatives  exist, 
spanning the continuum from traditional cooperation 
to collective entrepreneurship.  Intermediate models of 
cooperation  that  incorporate  a  measure  of  both 
elements are in essence hybrids of the two extremes 
presented here.  We develop our extreme examples of 
traditional  cooperation  and  collective 
entrepreneurship.  We then offer examples of hybrid 
models  that  may  fall  on  a  continuum  between 
traditional  cooperation  and  collective 
entrepreneurship. 
The concept of collective entrepreneurship has been 
used  by  scholars  in  many  disciplines  and  multiple 
sectors.  Burress  and  Cook  document  a  broad  set  of 
literature  that  covers  the  academic  and  practitioner  
usage of the term[1].  While some theorists argue that 
all entrepreneurship may be fundamentally collective 
in  nature  [2],  there  are  also  those  who  consider 
collective  entrepreneurship  as  a  subset  of 
entrepreneurship  [3].    However,  there  is  little 
agreement  on  what  constitutes  collective 
entrepreneurship.  For example, the term may refer to 
individuals  or  groups  organizing  to  affect  social 
change  [4],  public-private  partnerships  for 
technological  development  [5],  entrepreneurship 
among collaborating firms [6], or recipients of residual 
income from a collective enterprise [7].  We, however, 
focus  on  collective  entrepreneurship  as  it  relates  to 
risk-bearing,  multiple  level  rent-seeking,  patron-
owned firms in the agriculture and food sectors.  Thus, 
we utilize the term collective to refer to individuals 
jointly involved in the entrepreneurial process.  And, 
in  this  paper,  we  rely  heavily  on  a  Knightian  view 
which  envisions  an  entrepreneur  as  the  bearer  of 
uncertainty [8]. 
Our definition of collective entrepreneurship is the 
joint  process  by  which  patron-investors  design, 
finance, and incorporate a path-dependent collective 
action form of multiple level rent generation. This is a 
modification  of  the  Cook-Plunkett  definition  which 
did  not  include  ―patron‖[9].  This  definition  is 
formulated  specifically  for  agricultural  producer 
cooperative  action  but  may  be  expanded  to  other 
sectors.  I. PURPOSE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
DEFENSIVE VS. OFFENSIVE 
 
Patron-generated  collective  entrepreneurship  is 
observed in countries where production agriculture is 
dominated  by  family  farm  entities.  We  suggest  that 
collective entrepreneurship has evolved over the last 
one  hundred  and  fifty  years  from  a  defensive 
orientation  intending  to  redistribute  monopoly  rents, 
toward  this  more  offensive  structure  that  intends  to 
generate  Ricardian  and  entrepreneurial  rents  at 
multiple  levels.  This  path-dependent  adaptation  of 
organizational  form  and  purpose  fits  the  Schultzian 
concept of agricultural entrepreneurship [10].   
Since  the  mid  1800s,  scholars  and  practitioners 
have  been  developing  taxonomies  and  typologies  to 
describe group-oriented, commercial collective action. 
In Europe and North America, the emergent schools 
were not only influenced by the French and German 
cooperative philosophers, but by the pragmatic rules 
and  subsequent  principles  of  the  British  Rochdale 
Pioneers.  In  North  America,  three  forms  of 
agricultural  cooperatives  evolved:  (1)  the  Rochdale-
Nourse  consumer-driven,  multipurpose,  spatial  or 
local form of defensive cooperative (2) the Raiffeisen-
inspired rural credit cooperatives; and (3) the Sapiro, 
producer-driven, single purpose, commodity-oriented, 
defensive,  marketing  cooperatives.  In  all  of  these 
forms  of  user-controlled,  user-owned  and  user-
benefited cooperatives, the primary objective was to 
obtain  individual  member  benefits  through  joint 
action.  Various terms in the cooperative lexicon have 
been used to identify the amount of financial capital 
remaining  once  total  costs  are  subtracted  from  total 
revenues  such  as  net  savings,  surplus,  residual  and 
profit. Traditionally, these residuals were distributed 
to member patrons in proportion to utilization of the 
cooperative entity’s services.   
 
A. Traditional  Cooperation  as  a  Defensive 
Mechanism  for  Safeguarding  On-farm  Rent 
Generation Capacity 
Historically,  the financial capital employed in the 
founding  and  growth  of  the  Rochdale-Nourse  stock 
type  cooperatives  was  borrowed  or  generated  from 
earnings  and  the  residual  was  passed  on  to  the 
consumer-member    In  the  pooled  payment,  Sapiro-
type,  marketing  cooperative,  service  at  cost  was 
followed  very  strictly  .  These  types  of  cooperatives 
can be described as defensive in nature in that their 
primary  objective  was  to  pass  risk-bearing  to  the 
cooperative  level so  that individual  member  patrons 
could maintain their on-farm rent generating capacity.  
However,  as  patron-member  preferences  evolved, 
cooperatives  began  experiencing  internal  conflicts 
resulting  in  increasing  collective  decision-making 
costs.    As  cooperative  memberships  became  less 
homogeneous, in demographic and preference terms, 
challenges  to  low  cost  collective  decision-making 
became  more  pronounced.    Cook  and  Iliopoulos 
organize these challenges into two sets of collective 
decision-making  constraints  –  investment  preference 
conflicts  termed  internal  free  riding,  horizon,  and 
portfolio constraints and  control constraints identified 
as influence costs and agency costs [11].  
 
B. Patron-Driven, Offensive Mechanisms for the Joint 
Bearing of Uncertainty to  Seek Opportunities for 
Multiple-level Rent Generation  
During  most  of  the  twentieth  century,  successful 
European, Oceanic, and North American cooperatives 
created  innovative  selective  incentives  to  maintain 
high  degrees  of  homogeneity  among  their 
memberships. But some time in the late 20
th century 
producers began to shift their preferences toward more 
multiple  rent-generation  and  multiple  risk-bearing 
strategies.  It  is  from  observing  the  actions  of  these 
groups  of  producers  that  the  concept  of  collective 
entrepreneurship emerges. The emergence of multiple 
rent-oriented,  patron-oriented  producer  groups  in 
many countries is well documented [12], [13], [14], 
[15], [16], [17]. 
Some of the core concepts embedded in collective 
entrepreneurship derive their characteristics from the 
Sapiro school of agricultural collective action. These 
attributes include single commodity orientation, well-
defined,  long-term  contracts  obligating  members  to 
delivery,  and  a  centralized  membership  structure.  
However,  collective  entrepreneurs  have  adapted 
organizational  attributes  from  other  legal  forms  of 
organizational  design.    Collective  entrepreneurial 
organizations  generally  possess  transferable  delivery 
rights  and  obligations,  appreciable  equity 
shares/delivery  shares,  defined  membership,  and  a 
minimum  up-front  capital  investment  requirement—
attributes  commonly  found  in  limited  liability  joint 
stock companies.     
These  organizational  design  differences  as 
explained  in  depth  in  the  next  two  sections  and 
summarized  in  Table  1  have  considerable  risk  and 
rent-generation  implications.  These  producer-formed 
entities  incorporate  a  greater  degree  of  incentive alignment,  are  offensive  in  design,  seek  to  generate 
economic  rents  at  multiple  levels,  and  consequently 
create options for exit and wealth. There appears to be 
a  continuum  along  which  this  process  and  these 
organizational designs may locate. Table 1 describes 
the characteristics in a dynamic framework with the 
left hand column describing single-rent, ―traditional-
defensive‖  producer-owned-and-controlled  entities 
and the right hand column exhibiting the multiple rent 
generating,    ―offensive,‖  patron-controlled 
organizations.  
II. RENT GENERATION 
Evaluating  the  anticipated  rents  to  be  generated 
from  cooperation  may  help  to  distinguish  between 
traditional  cooperation  and  collective 
entrepreneurship.    Two  distinct  purposes  for 
organizing  correspond  to  distinct  economic 
justifications and expected methods of rent generation.  
Defensive  cooperatives,  in  an  effort  to  ameliorate 
some form of market failure, are often attempting not 
to create rents, per se, but rather primarily attempt to 
dissipate  monopoly  rents.    Offensive  cooperatives, 
however,  organize  in  response  to  a  perceived 
opportunity  in  the  market  and  primarily  attempt  to 
generate Ricardian or entrepreneurial rents. 
If  we  consider  Rochdale  cooperatives  as  an 
example of traditional cooperation, we note that the 
cooperative  entity  was  constructed  as  a  non-profit 
entity existing to pass the benefits of cooperation back 
to its members in proportion to patronage [18].  The 
cooperative  was  to  retain  only  enough  earnings  in 
order to continue in its designated function.  Under 
this  philosophy,  the  cooperative  primarily  exists  to 
protect its members from simple market power and ex 
post  market  power;  reduce  the  risks  of  long-term 
contracting;  ameliorate  problems  of  asymmetric 
information  including  moral  hazard,  hold  up,  and 
costly  strategic  bargaining;  credibly  communicate 
patron preferences; compromise among diverse patron 
preferences; reduce alienation; and minimize credit or 
supply rationing  [19-21].   
The value of the cooperative was not in its earning 
potential.  Typical examples of a cooperative’s value 
were  in  its  ability  to  attract  enough  members  and 
volume to wield bargaining power when buying inputs 
or  selling  raw  materials,  to  ensure  quality  products 
thus reducing moral hazard, or to ensure producers a 
market with reliable product grading. In the case of 
traditional  cooperatives  formed  due  to  defensive 
reasons, the cooperative had the potential to dissipate 
monopoly  rents  by  creating  a  bilateral  monopoly.  
This strategy was successful among many agricultural 
cooperatives  given  the  tendency  for  spatial 
monopolies  to  exist.    Lowering  transaction  costs 
arising due to moral hazard or hold up also allowed 
the cooperative to pass additional savings back to their 
members.    Patron-members  were  then  able  to 
maximize their returns at the farm-level. 
Over time, successful cooperatives may ameliorate 
market failure issues or market contracting costs [21].  
Future generations of producers no longer experience 
the  same  motivations  that  led  their  predecessors  to 
organize for defensive purposes.  Successful waves of 
defensive  cooperation  may,  in  fact,  be  one  of  the 
reasons we witness the development of new patron-
driven  strategies.    Amelioration  of  market  failure 
issues  may  allow  producers  to  focus  on  market 
opportunities further up or down the value chain. 
It  is  in  organizing  to  exploit  these  market 
opportunities  that  producers  begin  to  engage  in 
collective  entrepreneurship.    In  doing  so,  they  seek 
avenues  to  generate  Ricardian  and  entrepreneurial 
rents at multiple levels: the farm level and the firm 
level.  Producers are able to access Ricardian rents by 
investing in further processing or marketing activities 
because,  as  suppliers, they  have  extensive  ability  to 
improve the quality of inputs or produce according to 
exact  specifications.    Thus,  Ricardian  rents  are 
generated  by  the  producers’  collective  ability  to 
influence  consumer  price  through  the  provision  of 
quality  products  or  to  minimize  marketing  margins 
through  the  provision  of  raw  material  produced  to 
specification [22].  By definition, producers seeking 
entrepreneurial rents contribute upfront risk capital to 
invest in new resource combinations, uncertain of the 
value of those new combinations [23].    
Thus, if we are to develop a continuum to explain 
collective  action,  we  suggest  the  method  of  rent 
generation as one of the defining criteria.  Traditional 
cooperation would be dominated by the dissipation of 
monopoly rents.  Hybrid forms may begin to shift their 
focus  to  Ricardian  rent  generation;  while  collective 
entrepreneurs are primarily focused on the generation 
of entrepreneurial rents. 
III. THE BEARING OF UNCERTAINTY 
Knight  (1921)  holds  that  the  act  of  bearing 
uncertainty  is  a  distinct  characteristic  of  the 
entrepreneur  [8].    Therefore,  in  attempting  to distinguish  between  the  traditional  cooperative  and 
emerging instances of collective entrepreneurship, we 
look to the bearing of uncertainty in order to identify 
additional  distinguishing  criteria  and  their  resulting 
structural  implications.  We  find  joint  bearing  of 
uncertainty  is  a  notable  trait  of  collective 
entrepreneurship that results in significant changes to 
equity capitalization and membership requirements.  
A.  Mitigating  Farm-level  Risk  vs.  Joint  Bearing  of 
Uncertainty 
When  considering  a  patron-driven  cooperative 
endeavor, we must analyze two primary levels of rent 
generation:  the  farm  and  the  cooperative  firm.  
Traditional cooperation seeks to mitigate uncertainty 
at  the  level  of  the  farm  by  transferring  risk  to  the 
cooperative.  Several  traditional  functions  of  the 
cooperative  embody  this  transfer  of  risk  to  the 
cooperatives including  the  use  of  pooling  strategies, 
the use of a cooperative to ensure market access or 
service  provision,  and  the  Noursian  ideal  of  the 
cooperative  as  a  competitive  yardstick.    Thus, 
traditional cooperatives are an important mechanism 
for producers to reduce on-farm risk  [22].  Valentinov 
characterizes  this  function  of  the  traditional 
cooperative as ―offering members a degree of revenue 
insurance‖ (2007) [24].   
In agreement with the Knight’s assessment of large 
corporations, producers are able to mitigate the level 
of  uncertainty  they  experience  by  pooling  these 
uncertainties  within  a  larger  organization,  the 
traditional cooperative [25].  Therefore, the traditional 
cooperative,  although  an  efficient  mechanism  for 
mitigating  risk,  would  not  be  considered  an 
entrepreneurial  organization  in  the  Knightian  sense.  
Traditional  cooperation  was  therefore  designed 
primarily  as  a  means  to  mitigate  farm-level 
uncertainty.  The cooperative’s goal was to minimize 
costs at the firm-level while supporting a producer’s 
on-farm interests [26]. 
By contrast, those ventures assuming attributes of 
collective  entrepreneurship  call  upon  a  producer  to 
bear a greater degree of uncertainty at the farm-level 
and the firm-level.  Producers engaged in collective 
entrepreneurship  often  invest  upfront  risk  capital  in 
the  organization.    In  conjunction  with  their  share 
purchase,  they  contract  to  provide  the  venture  with 
raw inputs.  Due to the contractual obligation of the 
supplier relationship, the producer now bears a greater 
share of the production risk.  While in the traditional 
cooperative,  a  producer  may  choose  not  to  deliver, 
emerging collective entrepreneurial ventures such as 
new  generation  cooperatives  and  patron-owned 
limited  liability  companies  often  strictly  enforce 
delivery obligations. 
In addition to the increase in production risk borne 
by producers, producer-investors are exposed to firm-
level uncertainty experienced by the new cooperative 
entity  through  their  risk  capital  contribution.  
Producers  essentially  agree  to  bear  this  uncertainty 
jointly.  Often, on-farm risk may be amplified due to a 
closely-related  or  vertical  investment  strategy  that 
lowers investment diversification.  The advantage of 
investing in an organization that is dependent upon a 
producer’s  raw  inputs  is  often  touted  as  enabling 
producers to realize dual profits: profits at the farm-
level  through  increased  prices  paid  for  inputs  and 
profits at the firm-level through rents generated in the 
processing  of  those  inputs.    However,  if 
entrepreneurial  profits  are  generated  through  the 
bearing of uncertainty as in the Knightian perspective, 
we recognize that dual profit potential could manifest 
as  dual  jeopardy  in  times  of  economic  hardship.  
Among collective entrepreneurial ventures that failed, 
we  observe  instances  of  producers  losing  not  only 
their  initial  investment,  but  also  payments  for  their 
raw  material  inputs.    This  organizational  structure, 
while  allowing  producers  profit  potential,  is 
dramatically  different  from  the  traditional  notion  of 
cooperation with respect to its risk bearing attributes. 
Joint bearing of uncertainty may afford producers a 
mechanism  to  diffuse  the  level  of  uncertainty  that 
would have been borne by a single producer-investor 
in the entrepreneurial venture.  However, due to the 
assumption  of  production,  processing  and  marketing 
uncertainty  born  by  individual  producers  through 
supply  contracts  and  risk  capital  investments, 
collective entrepreneurial cooperative entities deviate 
from their traditional cooperative counterparts. 
B. Capital Generation 
Traditional cooperatives utilize retained earnings as 
their primary mechanism for capital generation.  This 
structural trait is a reflection of the transference of risk 
to the cooperative.  Minimal capital contributions are 
made in a passive or quasi-passive manner by patrons.  
Thus, the cooperative operates on generated savings or 
earnings.    In  addition,  contributed  capital  is  often 
redeemable  which  serves  to  lower  the  financial 
commitment and, therefore, level of uncertainty borne 
by the producer.  Traditionally, cooperatives were not 
focused  on  generating  equity  capital,  nor  building strong asset bases.  Limited equity capital has been a 
structural  consequence  for  many  traditional 
cooperatives [27],  [28]. Their primary function was, 
again, to support the producer’s on-farm production.  
Therefore,  savings  or  earnings  were  primarily 
intended to be passed back to the member, not to be 
utilized to capitalize the cooperative.  This structural 
characteristic  leads  Cortopassi  to  refer  to  equity 
capital  generated  from  retained  earnings  as  ―an 
accounting  misnomer  for  junior,  subordinated 
revolving debt’ (qtd in Staatz).  
Among  collective  entrepreneurial  ventures, 
members  often  commit  substantial,  upfront,  equity 
capital.    This  proactive  risk  capital  investment  is 
utilized  to  capitalize  the  cooperative  and  provide 
working  capital  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the 
cooperative’s  business  activities.    This  structural 
characteristic  sets  collective  entrepreneurial 
organizations  apart  from  traditional  cooperatives.  In 
addition, to the bearing of uncertainty through initial 
capital  contributions,  these  equity  capital  shares  are 
often  transferrable  and  appreciable,  but  not 
redeemable.    Therefore,  producer-shareholders  are 
committing  permanent  equity  capital  to  the 
cooperative,  a  characteristic  ―rarely‖  seen  in  the 
traditional  cooperative  setting  [27].  Examples  of 
patron-driven organizations relying on upfront equity 
capital contributions include Southern Minnesota Beet 
Sugar  Cooperative,  Fonterra,  and  the  majority  of 
producer-owned ethanol companies formed in United 
States in the last few decades.  
C. Membership 
Traditionally, cooperatives allow open membership.  
Members are not required to perform specific duties 
nor  are  they  obligated  to  deliver  certain  products.  
Thus,  cooperative  members  choose  when  to  do 
business  with  the  cooperative  and  at  what  level, 
depending upon their individual preferences during the 
production  season.  In  this  way,  uncertainty  with 
respect to agricultural marketing is largely transferred 
to the cooperative. 
In collective entrepreneurial ventures, membership 
is  often  closed.    In  addition,  stringent  production 
requirements or delivery obligations may be present.  
In this manner, the member assumes a greater level of 
production  uncertainty.  Supply  contracts  and 
marketing  agreements  are  examples  of  structural 
mechanisms that may signify the emergence of a more 
entrepreneurial  or  hybrid  organization  developing.  
These structural elements transfer a larger portion of 
the risk in the supply relationship to the producer than 
within the traditional cooperative structure. 
D. Patron vs. Investor Focus 
Traditional  cooperatives  primarily  focus  on  cost 
minimization or returns to members per unit of raw 
input supplied [26].  Thus, the cooperative exists to 
return benefits of membership to patrons on the basis 
of their patronage.  This is commonly referred to as 
the  user-benefits  principle[29].    Residual  claim  and 
residual  control  rights  are  distributed  solely  among 
patrons.  In addition, patrons are not required to bear 
uncertainty  individually.    The  cooperative  entity  is 
constructed  to  pool  uncertainties  arising  from 
production or marketing of raw material inputs.  
By contrast, collective entrepreneurial organizations 
demonstrate a greater reliance on distributing residual 
claims to investors contributing risk capital.  Investors 
elect  to  proactively  contribute  risk  capital  without 
knowing  the  probability  of  residual  claim  outcomes 
associated with this decision.  Although investors may 
enter into a supply relationship with the organization 
in  proportion  to  their  capital  investment,  additional 
raw  materials  potentially supplied outside  the  initial 
marketing contract would not be eligible for a benefits 
distribution at the same level of compensation as those 
supplied under the auspices of the marketing contract.  
Thus,  the  distribution  of  benefits  is  structured  to 
primarily reward investors’ capital contributions.  This 
type  of  cooperation  lies  in  stark  contrast  to  more 
traditional  cooperation  organized  under  Rochdale 
principles [30].   
E. Cooperative Performance Measures 
While  multiple  measures  of  cooperative 
performance  are  available,  patrons  of  traditional 
cooperatives often rely on prices paid for raw material 
inputs  to  gauge  the  performance  of  the  cooperative 
[31,  32].    Collective  entrepreneurial  organizations, 
however, are able to utilize share price or return on 
investment  shares  as  an  additional  measure  of 
cooperative  performance.  This  additional  level  of 
performance  evaluation  may  also  represent  another 
mechanism  for  the  cooperative  to  influence  a 
producer’s loyalty in addition to raw input pricing and 
contractual delivery obligations. 
Fluctuating  share  prices  constitute  a  distinct 
deviation from many original cooperative structures.  
Early American cooperative organizers elected to fix 
share prices at the value at which they were issued in an  attempt  to  reduce  speculation  and  deter  inflation 
[18].  No  unusual  risk  was  to  be  assumed  by  the 
cooperative.  By contrast, fluctuating share prices or 
measures of return on share price are structural traits 
of  collective  entrepreneurial  organizations  allowing 
producers  to  attempt  to  value  the  level  of 
entrepreneurial  rents  generated  in  the  bearing  of 
uncertainty at the level of the cooperative firm.  
F. Collective Decision-making 
Traditional  cooperative  structures  are  governed 
under  the  one-member,  one-vote  principle.    This 
governance structure enhances the democratic capacity 
of  its  producer-members.    It  is  important  to  note, 
however, that the defensive cooperative structure may 
be  more  susceptible  to  collective-decision  making 
costs  because  of  ill  defined  property  rights  [15].  
These costs arise from the misalignment of residual 
control  and residual claimant rights.   Therefore,  the 
one-member,  one-vote  structure  may  exacerbate 
collective decision-making costs.  The resulting free-
rider,  horizon,  portfolio,  influence  and  control 
problems  also  act  to  limit  producers’  willingness  to 
invest as individuals bearing uncertainty jointly.   
As  the  popularity  of  new  generation  cooperatives 
rose  in  the  early  1990’s,  one-member,  one-vote 
governance  structures  continued  to  dominate  these 
cooperative  forms.    However,  new  generation 
cooperatives  often  attempted  to  limit  the  number  of 
shares any one member could purchase.  This was an 
attempt  to  reduce  heterogeneity  of  member 
preferences  as  producer-investors  with  substantially 
different  risk  capital  contributions  often  exhibited 
different preferences when voting.  Newly emerging 
collective entrepreneurial ventures increasingly adopt 
weighted  voting  schemes  or  voting  proportional  to 
investment in order to minimize ill defined property 
right problems.  Governance structures that distribute 
voting  rights  in  proportion  to  capital  investments 
minimize  free-riding  and,  therefore,  are  a  more 
efficient structure for the joint bearing of uncertainty. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper discusses a dynamic that is occurring in 
patron-owned  firms,  an  entrepreneurial  form  of 
organization which attempts to capture benefits from 
both patron-oriented and investor-oriented models. We 
attempt  to  inform  the  interface  of  the  ownership 
literature with the entrepreneurship field – particularly 
the  emerging  study  of  collective  entrepreneurship. 
Using  rent  generation,  risk  and  uncertainty  bearing, 
capital  acquisition  techniques,  residual  claim  and 
residual  control  rights,  collective  decision-making 
costs, and performance measure elements to frame our 
discussion, we attempt to inform the uniqueness of an 
organizational  design  that  is  becoming  increasingly 
common in the agriculture and food sectors. 
Put into historical perspective, we see the traditional 
patron-owned design maintaining its favor as a single 
rent  level,  defensive  form  of  producer  cooperation 
employed for reducing the negative consequences of 
market  failures.    Nevertheless,  producers  are 
increasingly  organizing  offensive  cooperatives  – 
multiple level mechanisms for enhancing the vertical 
economic  options  of  their  agricultural  production 
units.  Thus, we conclude that all cooperatives are not 
created equal.  
Public  policy  makers  may  be  interested  in  the 
economic  growth  externalities,  decision-making 
processes  and  qualities,  democratic  practice 
implications,  collective  decision-making  skills  and 
leadership  training  that  evolve  from  collective 
entrepreneurship  initiatives  –  all  considered  to  be 
public  goods.    Additionally,  agricultural  producers, 
rural  development  specialists,  and  local  government 
leaders  may  be  interested  in  understanding  the 
differences  between  traditional  collective  action  and 
patron-investor  collective  entrepreneurship  activities.  
In numerous countries, we witness emerging changes 
to cooperative law that seek to foster the development 
of  collective  entrepreneurial  ventures  with  the 
structural  characteristics  described  in  this  piece.  
Lenders  and  other  input  suppliers  would  be  well 
advised to understand the risks and rewards of patron-
owned  entrepreneurial  ventures.  Although  often 
viewed  as  similar  in  organizational  architecture,  the 
economic  and  decision-making  differences  between 
these emerging collective entrepreneurial ventures and 
traditional forms of collective action are important and 
merit  scholarly  exploration.  The  objective  of  this 
paper is to foster further discussion of this important 
collective action phenomenon.  
  Table 1. Comparison of Forms of Cooperation 
  Traditional Cooperation  Hybrid Example  Collective Entrepreneurship 
Original Purpose 
of Cooperative 
- Defensive origins, 
often supplementing 
primary goals through 
multiple services  
- Defensive origins, evolving as 
a cooperative to incorporate 
multiple offensive 
characteristics including the 
introduction of  non-member 
business 
- Offensive origins 
Type of Rent 
Generation 
- Founding purpose to 
dissipate monopoly/ 
monopsony rents 
- Shifted from monopoly rent 
dissipation to Ricardian rent 
generation primarily due to 
competitive pressure  
- Founding purpose to access Ricardian, and 
entrepreneurial rents, secondary goals could 







- Farm-level uncertainty 
transferred to 
cooperative firm 
- Cooperative develops 
contractual arrangements and 
proportional capital 
mechanisms in an attempt to 
redistribute the bearing of 
uncertainty over the life of the 
cooperative 
- Patron-Investors bear a greater proportion of their 
farm-level risk by assuming contractual delivery 
obligations.  Patron-Investors engaged in joint 
uncertainty bearing with respect to non-redeemable 
risk capital contributions. 
 
Primary Source 
of Equity Capital 





- Allocated Earnings, Retains,  
and Non-member Business 
- Upfront Risk Capital Contributions, Allocated 
Earning, Retains, and Non-member Business. 
Membership  - Open membership, 
voluntary supply 
- Open membership subject to 
minimal business volume 
membership requirements, 
incentives developed to reward 
members for entering into 
supply contracts 
- Membership closed to shareholders, shareholders 
contract to assume the delivery obligations 
Distribution of 
Residual Claims 
- To patrons in 
proportion to use 
- To patron-users subject to 
minimum volume or equity 
capital levels. Distribution of 
fixed dividends to patron-
investors may be introduced 
through preferred equity stock 
programs. 
- To patron-investors, often including contractual 
arrangements that govern supply.  Patron-investors 




- Primary focus is on 
prices paid per unit of 
raw inputs or cost per 
unit of purchased input 
 
- Primary focus on prices paid 
per unit of raw inputs, with 
secondary emphasis on equity 
revolvement period   
- Dual focus on (1) share price or return to shares 
and (2) price paid for raw input materials 
Collective 
Decision-Making 
- Most organizations 
rely on one-member, 
one-vote governance 
structure  
- Weighted equity voting and 
mulit-tiered systems in an 
attempt to align residual 
control rights with residual 
claimants rights 
- Increasingly utilizing legal structures that allow for 
the alignment of residual control rights with 
residual claimant rights.  However, organizations 
that continue to rely on one-member, one-vote 
often cap the number of shares that can be owned 
by each individual in an effort to align investors’ 
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